



Chinese University of Hong Kong
sinkwancheng@gmail.com
Abstract: My  essay  begins  by  analyzing  how  Hegel  and  Honneth’s
theory  of  recognition  would  seem  to  lend  support  to  insurgent
terrorists’  struggle  for  the  right  to  self-determination.  Insurgent
terrorism often looks like a concretization of what Honneth calls the
moral  protest  of  the  oppressed  launched  against  the  dominating
powers.  Insurgent  terrorism  also  bears  affinity  to  the  politics  of
recognition in the sense that it challenges the legitimacy and authority
of the forces owned by the state, and seeks to gain public recognition
instead for the legitimacy of their own cause. Precisely because what
matters uppermost to terrorists is the gaining of recognition for their
cause as just, terrorists are eager to seize the mass media as a means
of spreading their ideas. My essay will end, however, by pointing out
major differences between insurgent terrorism on the one hand, and
Hegel and Honneth on the other. 
Keywords: colonialism  and  decolonization,  imagined  community,
insurgent,  recognition, subaltern,  state’s  monopoly on the legitimate
use of force.
Resumen:  Mi  trabajo  empieza  analizando  cómo  el  pensamiento  de
Hegel  y  la  teoría  del  reconocimiento  de  Honneth  pudieran  aparecer
como  apoyo  conceptual  en  la  lucha  terrorista  por  el  derecho  de
autodeterminación. El terrorismo a menudo puede tomar la apariencia
de lo que Honneth llama la protesta moral de los oprimidos contra los
poderes dominantes. El terrorismo, igualmente, muestra afinidad con
* This paper was first given as an invited presentation on September 28, 2002 at
“The Internationalization of Critical Theory” Conference, co-sponsored by the
DAAD and the Institute of German Cultural Studies, Cornell University. I am
most  grateful  to  the  International  Institute  for  Asian  Studies  at  Leiden
University  for  supporting  my  revision  of  this  essay  with  an  IIAS  Affiliated
Fellowship.
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la política del reconocimiento en tanto pone en cuestión la legitimidad y la
autoridad de los poderes del Estado, y trata de ganar el reconocimiento
público  en  favor  de  la  legitimidad  de  su  propia  causa.  Precisamente
porque el gran objetivo del terrorismo es captar el reconocimiento para su
causa  como  causa  justa,  los  terroristas  se  afanan  por  ganarse  a  los
medios de comunicación con el objeto de expandir sus ideas. Mi trabajo
concluye,  sin  embargo,  señalando  diferencias  fundamentales  entre  el
terrorismo y el pensamiento de Hegel y Honneth.
Palabras clave: Colonialismo y descolonización,  comunidad imaginada,
insurgente, reconocimiento, subalterno, monopolio del uso legítimo de la
fuerza por parte del Estado.
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Aprobado: 18/04/2013
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efore I proceed, let me clarify that it is not the intention of this
paper to argue for or against terrorism. Rather, my agenda is to
analyze what motivates insurgent terrorism from the viewpoint of
the politics of recognition. I adopt the expression “politics of recognition”
from  Charles  Taylor's  essay  of  the  same  name  and  Axel  Honneth's
Struggle  for  Recognition.1 Both  Taylor  and  Honneth  believe  that  “our
identity  is  partly  shaped  by  recognition  or  its  absence,  often  by  the
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer
real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror
back  to  them  a  confining  or  demeaning  or  contemptible  picture  of
themselves”.2 When  talking  about  misrecognition,  Taylor  and  Honneth
have foremost in their minds the injustices faced by subaltern groups. For
both  of  them,  subaltern  groups'  protest  against  misrecognition  or
humiliation is a moral necessity. In the interest of space, I can only focus
on  one  of  these  two  thinkers,  and  I  have  chosen  to  concentrate  on
Honneth's theory —especially as it is influenced by Hegel’s master/slave
dialectic.  I  will  begin by analyzing how Hegel and Honneth’s  theory of
recognition would seem to lend support to insurgent terrorists’ struggle
for the right to self-determination. I will  end, however,  by pointing out
major differences between insurgent terrorism on the one hand, and Hegel
and Honneth on the other.
B
Axel  Honneth's  most  important  contribution  to  social  theory  is
perhaps his interpretation of the demands of new social movements in
terms of a moral claim rather than as an interest claim for any particular
group. Honneth shifts the basis for revolt and resistance from the material
to the moral,  hence the subtitle  of  his book ―“The Moral  Grammar of
Social  Conflicts”.  In  his  “Reply  to  Andreas  Kalyvas”.  Honneth  further
explains the significance of his transformation of Marxism in discussing
social struggle: “it is in general more meaningful to assume the experience
of  disrespect  or  humiliation  as  motivational  cause  for  protest  and
resistance instead of presupposing, as was common in Marxist theory for
a  long  time,  the  (utilitarian)  dynamic  of  injured  interests”.3 Honneth
1 Axel  Honneth.  (1995).  Struggle  for  Recognition:  The  Moral  Grammar  of  Social
Conflicts. Oxford: Polity Press.
2 Charles Taylor. (1994). “Politics of Recognition”, in Multiculturalism: Examining the
Politics of Recognition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p. 25.
3 Axel  Honneth.  (1999).  “Reply  to  Andreas  Kalyvas,  'Critical  Theory  at  the
Crossroads:  Comments  on  Axel  Honneth’s  Theory  of  Recognition'”,  European
Journal of Social Theory, 2: p. 250.
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argues that subaltern groups ought to protest against unfair treatment,
not so much in response to their injured interests, as in response to their
moral  expectations being violated ―expectations which are  based on a
tacit understanding of the respect an individual or group deserves qua
being part of the human community. Honneth derives his idea from the
young Hegel for whom social conflicts are animated by moral impulses
rather  than  mere  instincts  for  self-preservation,  by  intersubjective
dynamics  rather  than  individual  subjects’  raw  biology.  According  to
Honneth, such struggle for mutual recognition “generate[s] inner-societal
pressure toward the practical, political establishment of institutions that
would guarantee freedom”.4
I. Struggle for recognition according to Honneth
For  Honneth,  human  beings'  self-worth  and  self-realization  are
dependent  on  recognition  from  others.  He  differentiates  among  three
kinds of recognition: the recognition through love, through rights or law,
and  through  solidarity.  Recognition  from  loved  ones  gives  one  self-
confidence. Through rights, one is recognized as possessing equal dignity
and worth as  other  human beings  before  the  law.  Last  but  not  least,
communities  with  shared  values  provide  frameworks  within  which
particular individuals can gain social esteem. Social conflicts arise when
individuals are denied any one of these recognitions. As Joel Anderson
points out, “The 'grammar' of such struggles is  'moral' in the sense that
the feelings of outrage and indignation driving them are generated by the
rejection of claims to recognition and thus imply normative judgements
about the legitimacy of social arrangements”.5
II. Insurgent terrorists struggle for recognition
The two kinds of recognition most relevant for the study of terrorism
are  recognition  through  rights  and  solidarity  —but  particularly
recognition  through  rights.  Since  legal  recognition  is  a  much  more
complicated issue, I will begin with the issue of solidarity and then work
my argument back to the topic of legal recognition.
II.a. Solidarity
Terrorists usually belong to some kind of organization and derive
4 Ibid., p. 5.
5 Joel Anderson (1995), “Translator’s Introduction”,  in Axel Honneth,  The Struggle
for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Oxford: Polity Press, p. xii.
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their identity from being part of that group. There exists among members
of  the same organization a fraternal spirit  which binds together group
members who are united in their commitment to the same ideal and their
similar predicament of confronting life in its most extreme and intimate
relations to death. The sense of brotherhood and solidarity is even more
intense among hard-core terrorists who tend to be absolutists and see the
world  in  black  and  white,  us  versus  them.  Of  particular  interest  in
understanding recognition through solidarity among terrorists is that they
are driven by a  sense of  solidarity  not  only with their  own immediate
group but also with an imagined community. Benedict Anderson's theory
can well be used to theorize the following characterization of terrorists by
Albert Bandura: “Some terrorist violence is carried out by self-appointed
crusaders who act on behalf of [an imagined] oppressed people with whom
they  identify.  They  are  motivated  [...]  by  ideological  imperatives  and
mutual  reward  of  their  efforts  by  fellow  members”6 as  well  as  by
recognition from an imagined community of brothers whom they do not
know  in  person.  Terrorists  typically  mobilize  the  media  and  launch
propagandistic  wars  to  explain  to  the  public  their  activities  and  their
cause. Such practice is based on the assumption and imagination of the
existence of a community of fellow sympathizers―a community which they
also seek to expand through their propaganda and acts of terrorism.
II.b. Terrorists' Struggle for Recognition of their Rights
Being accorded rights is crucial to self-respect. Honneth highlights
this point by making use of Joel Feinberg's argument that “what is called
`human  dignity'  may  simply  be  the  recognizable  capacity  to  assert
claims”.7 Terrorist  groups  often  perceive  themselves  as  the  “oppressed
group”  —that  is,  a  group deprived of  their  rights  and human dignity.
Being deprived of  legal recognition,  they attack the state and sabotage
institutions  associated  with  the  legal  establishment―thereby  making  a
symbolic declaration of the invalidity and illegitimacy of existing laws.
6 Albert Bandura. (1990). “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement”,  in Walter Reich
(ed.)  Origins  of  Terrorism:  Psychologies,  Ideologeis,  Theologies,  States  of  Mind.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.178.
7 Joel Feinburg. (1980). “The Nature and Value of Rights”, in Rights, Justice, and the
Bounds of  Liberty:  Essays in  Social  Philosophy.  Princeton:  Princeton University
Press.
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III. The Struggle for Rights according to Insurgent Terrorists and 
Axel Honneth: Some Continuities
At first sight, it seems as if terrorist activities concretized Honneth's
theory about the struggle for recognition. Honneth focuses on the moral
dimension in social conflict. Joel Anderson highlights that for Honneth,
“'moral' motives for revolt and resistance [...] do not emerge only in the
defences of traditional ways of life [...] but also in situations where those
ways of life have become intolerable”:
Because  key  forms  of  exclusion,  insult,  and  degradation  can  be  seen  as
violating  self-confidence,  self-respect,  or  self-esteem,  the  negative  emotional
reactions generated by these experiences of disrespect provide a pretheoretical
basis for social critique. [...] the potential emerges for collective action aimed at
actually expanding social patterns of recognition.8
Terrorists can be interpreted as Honneth's “victims of disrespect”,
who, by engaging in political action, tear themselves “out of the crippling
situation of passively endured humiliation and [help] them, in turn, on
their way to a new, positive relation-to-self”.9 Terrorist activities, in other
words, can be understood as an attempt to overcome “the diminished self-
respect typically accompanying the passive endurance of humiliation and
degradation”.  Through  their  act  of  “collective  resistance,  individuals
uncover  a  form of  expression  with  which they  can  indirectly  convince
themselves of their moral or social worth”.10
Above all, it is Honneth's debt to Hegel's Master/Slave dialectic in
formulating  his  struggle  for  recognition  that  brings  him  close  to  the
terrorists' position. Honneth is inspired by Hegel who locates the hallmark
of humanity in human beings’ willingness to sacrifice their lives and to
give up on self-preservation for the sake of recognition. The struggle for
recognition is for Honneth a moral struggle, because it raises a human
being above his/her instinct for self-preservation —and only with such a
readiness  to  give  up  life  for  dignity  do  human  beings  differentiate
themselves  from  other  animals.  What  is  at  issue  in  the  struggle  for
recognition is  one’s  honor  and humanity  rather  than “mere  life.”  Self-
realization through mutual recognition, rather than self-preservation, is
what is at issue for Honneth in theorizing subaltern struggles. Despite
8 Cfr. Anderson (n. 6), p. xix.
9 Cfr. Honneth (1995, n. 2), p. 164.
10 Ibid.
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Honneth's  attempt  to  read  Hegel's  life-and-death  struggle  “in  a
metaphorical  sense”  ―in  that  “a  subject  is  forced  to  realize  that  a
meaningful life is only possible in the context of the recognition of rights
and duties”11 ―his prioritization of dignity above mere self-interest (which
necessarily includes the interest of self-preservation) makes it tempting to
imagine Honneth as at least theoretically endorsing suicidal bombers who
place  their  honor  and  the  honor  of  their  people  above  mere  life.12
Interestingly enough, death is a means for terrorists to assert their rights
and  their  equal  dignity  with  their  enemies.  Death  wipes  out  all  the
humiliating  inequality  that  exist  between  the  dominating  and  the
dominated. While alive, the powerful and the powerless are unequal. But
in death, this humiliating structure of misrecognition is eliminated.
Honneth seems to make intelligible not just the terrorists' suicidal
behavior but also their killing of others. On this latter subject, Honneth's
source  of  inspiration  is  again  Hegel  ―this  time  Hegel's  theorization  of
crime. Honneth explains how, for Hegel, crime differs from exigency13 in
that it is motivated by the desire for recognition:
Built into the structure of human interaction there is a normative expectation
that  one  will  meet  with  the  recognition  of  others,  or  at  least  an  implicit
assumption that one will be given positive consideration in the plans of others.
[...]  The reason why the socially ignored individuals attempt,  in response, to
damage  the  others'  possessions  is  not  because  they  want  to  satisfy  their
passions, but rather in order to make the others take notice of them. Hegel
interprets the destructive reaction of the excluded party as an act whose real
aim is to win back the attention of the other.14
Honneth's “compatibility” with the terrorists' position seems to be
more solidly confirmed by his reference to Sartre as one of his theoretical
predecessors. Honneth even cites Sartre's championing of decolonization
as an explication of what he means by the struggle for recognition. And,
when one thinks of Sartre as a spokesman for decolonization, one cannot
possibly overlook his endorsement of violence as a means for liberating
the colonized, especially in the context of Algeria.
Honneth  speaks  approvingly  of  Sartre's  later  work  where  “the
11 Cfr. Honneth (1995, n.2), p. 45.
12 A Taliban spokesman, for example, openly declared that his people love death as
much  as  the  Americans  love  life.  Cfr.  Seyla  Benhabib  (2002)  “Unholy  Wars”,
Constellations 9 (1): p. 38.
13 Ibid., p. 53.
14 Ibid., p. 44; my italics.
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struggle for recognition [...] came to be interpreted as a phenomenon that
is caused by an asymmetrical relationship between social groups [...] and
is, in principle, open to being overcome”:
This historically relativized model of conflict came to dominate the essays Sartre
composed  on  the  anti-colonialist  movement  of  négritude  in  particular
(Situations V).  There,  colonialism is understood as a social  site that  distorts
intersubjective relationships of  reciprocal recognition in such a way that the
participant groups are pressed into a quasi-neurotic scheme of behaviour. The
only way that the colonizers can work through the self-contempt that they feel
for  themselves as a  result  of  systematically  denigrating the native  people  is
through cynicism or heightened aggression, and the only way the colonized are
able to endure the “common degradation” is by splitting their conduct into the
two  parts  of  ritual  transgression  and  habitual  over-accommodation
(“Introduction to Fanon,” 16 f.)15
Honneth  further  follows  Sartre's  argument  about  how  the
asymmetrical relationship between the colonizer and the colonized makes
necessary  a  simultaneous  denial  and  maintenance  of  relationships  of
mutual  recognition,  the  result  of  which  is  a  psychopathology  called
“neurosis”:
[F]or Sartre, the asymmetrical patterns of communication between the settler
and  the  native  that  are  found  in  the  colonial  system  represent  interactive
relations  that  demand  from  both  sides  the  simultaneous  denial  and
maintenance of relationships of mutual recognition. For, in order for interaction
to be possible at all, the colonial master has to both recognize and disrespect
the native as a human person in just the way that  the latter  is forced into
'laying  claims  to  and  denying  the  human  condition  at  the  same  time'
(“Introduction” to Fanon, 17). 
As a label for the type of social relationship that must result from this reciprocal
denial of claims to recognition [...], Sartre introduced the concept of “neurosis”
at this point. [...] “neurotic” is meant to designate not an individual behavioural
disorder with a psychological aetiology but rather a pathological distortion of
relations of interaction stemming from the reciprocal denial of relationships of
recognition that are still effective below the surface (“Introduction to Fanon”, 18,
19).16
The  asymmetrical  relationship  between  the  colonizer  and  the
colonized,  in  other  words,  prevents  a  healthy  kind  of  intersubjective
mutual  recognition from coming into  being.  It  would seem natural,  in
15 Ibid., p. 157.
16 Ibid.
Las Torres de Lucca
Nº 2 (enero-junio 2013): 47-67
Insurgent Terrorism, the Subaltern, and the Politics of Recognition... 55
other  words,  for  the  politics  of  recognition  to  endorse  the  project  of
decolonization ―including the violent kind Sartre sometimes approves of.
And if the logic of Honneth obliges him to fully approve of Sartre's position
on  decolonization,  he  would  have  to  endorse  terrorism  in  the  late
twentieth- and early twenty-first-centuries also.
The logic of Honneth's argument, in other words, seems to oblige
him to endorse terrorism, if terrorism is to be seen as a legitimate means
for  bringing  about  decolonization.  Terrorism  seems  all  the  more
continuous with the project of decolonization, when we keep in mind Kofi
Annan's description of one of the major faultlines in today's world being
the division between the “privileged and humiliated” ―those who have all
the  glorious  recognition,  and  those  on  whom  is  imposed  the  most
degrading forms of misrecognition. The following is the Nobel Prize speech
Kofi Annan gave in Oslo on December 10, 2001:
Today's  real  borders  are  not  between  nations,  but  between  powerful  and
powerless,  free  and fettered,  privileged  and humiliated.  Today,  no walls  can
separate humanitarian or human rights crises in one part of the world from
national security crises in another.17 
Indeed, 20th-century and especially 21st-century terrorism seem to
be triggered by the great asymmetry among different social and political
entities  and  the  great  imbalance  of  power  which  makes  impossible  a
healthy  intersubjective  mutual  recognition  between  different  nations,
different races,  or different social  classes. The discrepancy becomes so
intense  that  terrorist  outbreaks  seem  to  be  a  concretization  of  what
Honneth calls the moral protest of the oppressed launched against the
dominating powers.
So  far,  the  logic  of  Honneth's  argument  seems  to  bind  him  to
endorse terrorism. However, this would be the case only if it could fulfil
Honneth's  requirement  of  legitimacy for  any  struggle  for  recognition.
However, precisely in terrorists’ disregard for legitimacy and normativity,
terrorism turns out to be a perversion rather than an exemplification of
Honneth's theory concerning the struggle for recognition. Mainly, Honneth
insists  on  the  respect  for  the  criterion  of  legitimacy  as  the  absolute
foundation on which any struggle for recognition is to be carried out. As
he puts it,
17 Kofi  Annan,  “Nobel  Lecture,”  Oslo,  December  10,  2001,  17  November  2009
<http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2001/annan-
lecture.html>.
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[R]ights and social esteem […] represent a moral context for societal conflict, if
only because they rely on socially generalized criteria in order to function. In
light of norms of the sort constituted by the principle of moral responsibility or
the values of society, personal experience of disrespect can be interpreted and
represented as something that can potentially affect other subjects.18
Expressions  such  as  “rights”  and  “socially  generalized  criteria”
highlight  Honneth's  concern  for  legitimacy  and  normativity.  It  is  not
surprising that in his explication of Honneth's theory, Joel Anderson also
foregrounds the sense of indignation provoked by social injustice as made
possible by some kind of “normative judgements about the legitimacy of
social arrangements”:
the  grammar  of  [the  subalterns’]  struggles  is  'moral' in  the  sense  that  the
feelings of outrage and indignation driving them are generated by the rejection
of  claims  to  recognition  and  thus  imply  normative  judgements  about  the
legitimacy of social arrangements.19
Given  that  for  Honneth,  legitimacy  and  normativity  are  the
framework for allowing the moral grammar of social struggles to unfold,
terrorism  cannot  possibly  qualify  as  a  struggle  for  recognition  in
Honneth's  sense.  Terrorists do not recognize state law or international
law,  nor  do  they  respect  the  conventions  of  war  which  require
discrimination  between  combatants  and  civilians.  If  the  state  is
understood in Max Weber's sense as the entity that has “a monopoly on
the legitimate use of  force”,  this legitimacy is  precisely  what  terrorism
tries  to  undermine  rather  than to  uphold.20 In  fact,  the  real  target  of
terrorist attack against the state seems to be precisely this idea that the
state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Since terrorism is
usually employed by a weak party against a strong one, what terrorists
seek to undermine in their attack is not so much the might, but the right
18 See Honneth (1995, n. 2), p. 162; my italics.
19 See Anderson (n. 6), p. xii.
20 This is why terrorism often pays no regard to any norms or rules associated with
“legitimacy”.  As Irving Howe, Robert  Friedlander,  Cindy Combs,  and a number
other  theorists  have  observed,  terrorism  involves  the  deliberate  disruption  of
norms. Interestingly enough, while terrorism is being faulted by ruling parties for
not recognizing the legitimacy of the state, the same criticism is much less often
launched by them against global capital, which in many ways also demonstrate a
lack of  respect for  the state.  In fact,  both terrorism and global  capital  seek to
establish themselves over  and above  the  state.  More  interestingly  still,  despite
first-world governments’ tendency to criminalize terrorism while fawning on global
capital,  supranational terrorism and global capital  are often implicated in each
other.
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of a state.21 Terrorists deliberately violate the principle that “the state has
a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence” because, in their eyes, the
state itself is not a legitimate body in the first place. And it is their outrage
at  the  state's  various  “illegitimate”  and  “unjust”  practices  that  the
terrorists seek to shock the public into listening.
While  terrorists  are  by  and  large  regarded  by  outsiders  as  an
illegitimate group,22 terrorists themselves often see their acts as perfectly
legitimate,  as  the  protector  of  Justice  Terrorists  openly  challenge  the
legitimacy and authority of the forces owned by the state, seeking to gain
public recognition instead for the legitimacy of their own cause and their
own use of violence to topple what they perceive to be a corrupt regime.
However, their notion of legitimacy is messianic, in contrast to Honneth’s
idea  of  legitimacy  which  is  grounded  in  normativity.  Terrorists  often
sacrifice themselves in the name of a grand cause, and it is in that name
that they seek to be recognized.
In  Lacanian  language,  insurgent  terrorists  typically  dedicate
themselves  to a  big Other  which is  an emblem of  political  virtues  (for
example, Justice and Equality).  Oftentimes, terrorist violence is carried
out by self-appointed champions of justice who act on behalf of oppressed
people  with  whom they identify.  They  are  motivated,  in  large  part,  by
ideological  imperatives and the reward and approval of  their  efforts by
fellow members. For this reason, terrorists believe that legitimacy is on
their side. Terrorists appoint themselves to be the rightful guardians of
Justice, in contrast to the state which the terrorists perceive to be a mere
corrupt enterprise. In attacking the existing legal and political structure,
the terrorists see themselves as serving a higher law and a big Other that
has real legitimacy. Leila Khaled, for example, claimed that their terrorist
movements are “fighting for humanity―all those who are oppressed and
tortured”.23 In  other  words,  the  terrorists'  struggle  is  for  recognition,
21 Terrorists  have  to  focus  on legitimacy  issues  both for  moral  and  for  strategic
reasons. As Burleigh Taylor Wilkins explains, “only by appealing to the court of
public  opinion can terrorists  hope to  achieve their  goals”.  See  Burleigh Taylor
Wilkins. (1992). Terrorism and Collective Responsibility. London: Routledge, p. 4.
22 The  dilemma of  the  terrorists  is  that  their  legitimacy  is  in  many  cases  being
refused recognition not just by the government but also by society at large. This is
especially the case when their claim of fighting for human justice is seen by the
general populace as being contradicted by their killing of the innocent.
23 Interview, BBC “Man Alive” programme on terrorism 12 June 1975. Leila Khaled is
a member of  the  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.  She became
known to the world public when she involved herself in the hijacking of an Israeli
airliner over Britain on 6 September, 1970. She was overpowered. According to
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rather than for immediate military success. Their immediate goal is public
support. They think that if they can undermine the state on the issue of
“right”, the destruction of its might will follow by the time they have the
public on their side. Since the terrorists' immediate goal is to win over
public opinion, the “wars” they carry out are generally symbolic wars. In
other words, it is the messages being conveyed by the attack rather than
their practical destructiveness that is uppermost in the terrorists' minds.
Not unlike Lacan's notion of demand, terrorist activities carry with
them a  demand for  recognition―a  demand to  have  their  agent’s  voice
heard or read―and this demand certainly exceeds the need for inflicting
significant physical damages on the enemy. To further drive home how
terrorist war is at its core a war for recognition, let me draw attention to
how  terrorists  often  begin  their  careers  by  making  speeches  and
distributing pamphlets. Failing to catch public attention, they then try to
bomb the public into listening.24 As much as the terrorists are driven by
idea(l)s,  it  is ultimately the attempt to gain public recognition for their
political idea or message, rather than the material consequences of killing,
that  they are  concerned with  in their  activities.25 This  is  why violence
committed by insurgent terrorists is usually “signed”.26
Politically  motivated  terrorism  carried  out  against  a  state  in  the
name  of  liberation  movements  is  designed  to  awaken  the  broader
population to an injustice that the terrorists feel only they are sufficiently
aware of. Terrorists therefore actively seek publicity for their cause in the
effort  to enlist  popular  support  for the social  or political  changes they
desire. Terrorists often “perform” for the television to gain sympathy and
Khaled,  although  she  was  carrying  two  hand  grenades  at  the  time,  she  had
received very strict instructions not to threaten passengers on the civilian flight.
She was held for  twenty-three days at Ealing police  station,  and was released
afterwards  as  part  of  a  prisoners’  exchange
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leila_Khaled>.
24 See  Richard  E.  Rubenstein.  (1987).  Alchemists  of  Revolution:  Terrorism  in  the
Modern World. New York: Basic Books.
25 The struggle for recognition is so crucial to terrorist activities that one thinker
even defines terrorism as “a strategy, a method by which an organized group or
party  tries  to  get  attention for  its  aims,  or  force concessions toward its  goals,
through the systematic use of deliberated violence” (my italics). See F. M. Watson.
(1976). Political Terrorism: The Threat and the Response. Washington-NY: Robert B.
Luce Co., p. 1. Typical terrorists are individuals trained and disciplined to carry
out the violence decided upon by their organizations. And, if caught, true terrorists
can be expected to speak and act during their trials not primarily to win personal
freedom, but to try to spread their organization's political ideas.
26 Gianfranco Pasquino. (1996). “Terrorism”,  in The Social Science Encyclopedia, p.
872. London: Routledge.
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support for their plight. This generally takes the form of a narrative that
presents  the  terrorists  as  risking  their  lives  for  the  well-being  of  a
victimized constituency whose legitimate grievances have been ignored.
They  often  attempt  to  minimize,  or  deflect  attention  from,  the  harm
inflicted through their terrorist acts by centring attention on the injustices
perpetrated by the state or the states they are combating.
Since the terrorists' challenge to the state is on the level of ideas
and recognition rather than a serious exercise of military force, it is not
surprising that terrorism and counter-terrorism always go hand-in-hand
with  propaganda  wars—most  notably  in  the  form  of  media  wars.27
Precisely because what matters uppermost to terrorists is the gaining of
recognition for their cause as just, terrorists are eager to seize the mass
media as a means of spreading their ideas. Terrorist acts are designed to
teach  and  “educate”  the  populace  through  a  form of  real-life  political
theatre. The key point here is that terrorists generally do not maintain a
distinction between ideas and actions. Their teachings are not articulated
in  abstract  expressions,  but  are  dramatized  vividly  for  their  students
through concrete  examples  of  terrorist  activities  in  real  life.  Terrorism
itself is theatre.28 As the nineteenth-century anarchists claimed, terrorism
is “demonstration by example” and “propaganda by deed”. One can even
say that, for the terrorists, it is more important to win the media war than
the military campaign. The reason is, so long as the terrorists succeed in
27 The fact that it is the “right” (legitimacy) ―and not the “might” (power)― of the
terrorists and their opponent that is at issue for the success or failure of a terrorist
act explains the two sides’ scramble to be the “authoritative interpreter” of the
symbolic  meaning  of  the  terrorist  acts.  For  example,  in  the  9/11  attack,  the
terrorists intended an iconic assault on the United States’ military and financial
power―and the overbearing,  domineering manner in which it  was wielded. The
Bush administration, however, insisted on reading the act as a declaration of war
on civilians and the innocent. Insurgent terrorists challenge the governing power
symbolically  by  seeking  to  undermine  the  public’s  recognition  for  the  state.
Terrorists emerge victorious, not when they succeed in destroying certain targets,
but when their intended message—that is, their interpretation of their acts and
their  idea/ideology―win  public  recognition.  In  other  words,  the  propagandistic
wars between the terrorists and their opponents over the correct interpretation of
the symbolic significance of particular terrorist acts amount to no less than their
relentless struggle against each other for legitimacy.
28 See Brian Jenkins. (1986). “Statements about Terrorism”, in Steven Anzovin (ed.)
Terrorism. New York: H. W. Wilson Co, pp. 8-17. Cindy Combs. (1997). Terrorism
in the Twenty-First Century. Upper Saddle River, N. J.: Prentice Hall. See also M.
Tugwell.  (1987).  “Terrorism  and  Propaganda:  Problem  and  Response”,  in  Paul
Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (ed.) Contemporary Research on Terrorism. Aberdeen:
Aberdeen UP-Pergamon Group, pp. 409-18.
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hijacking the legitimacy of the state, even if the immediate terrorists get
eliminated, other people dissatisfied with the state will look upon them as
martyrs and perhaps even turn terrorists themselves. By contrast, if the
terrorists lose their moral authority and popular support, they will easily
disintegrate.
IV. Law, the Moral Grammar of Political Struggle, and Toward a 
Peaceful Struggle for Recognition
IV.a. Why Terrorism is Not a Viable Means for the Struggle for Recognition
As often as terrorists like to insist on the legitimacy of their own
operations as sanctioned by a “higher law”, their self-bestowed legitimacy
does not really hold, in that law is both based on, and enforces, mutual
recognition between equal parties. As Hegel points out,
Law [...]  is the  relation of persons, in their conduct,  to others, the universal
element of their free being or the determination, the limitation of their empty
freedom. It is not up to me to think up or bring about this relation or limitation
for myself; rather, the subject-matter [Gegenstand] is itself this creation of law
in general, that is, the recognizing relation.29
Terrorism is based on anything but mutual recognition and respect.
It is an absolutely unilateral violent imposition of one side's will on the
other. This is precisely why terrorists can never gain the recognition of
legitimacy  in  Honneth’s  sense.  Not  unlike  its  counterpart  state  terror,
insurgent  terrorism  is  also  based  on  unilateral  decisions.  Neither
insurgent  terrorism  nor  state  terror  is  conducive  to  peace  precisely
because  both  are  devoid  of  legitimacy,  and  they  both  lack  legitimacy
because  unilateral  decision  short-circuits  the  necessity  to  respect  and
recognize the other party's position. It is possible for terrorists to cower
their opponent into submission, but such victory by force does not mean
that the terrorists can gain the recognition of legitimacy in the world’s
eyes, less to mention in the eyes of their opponents. It is important to
defer conflicts to the law because law is,  in Lacanian terms,  the third
party or the Big Other which breaks up the aggressivity characterizing the
two-party imaginary register, and it does so by giving parties of conflicts
equal  recognition through  granting  them  equal  rights.  That  way,  the
29 G.W.F. Hegel, “Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit”, in Leo Rauch (trans.
and ed.) (1983), Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on
the Philosophy of Spirit (1805-6) with Commentary, p. 111; translation modified by
Joel Anderson (n. 6), p. 42.
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“losing”  side  will  not  feel  that  it  loses  because  it  is  being  “taken  for
granted” or casually bullied by its opponent. By contrast, short-circuiting
the  law  reduces  the  injured  to  mere  victims  who  feel  that  their
autonomous  will  has  not  been  consulted:  whoever  is  attacked  feels
themselves objectified and their dignity compromised.
By privatizing violence, by making unilateral claims about one’s own
legitimacy,  terrorists  proceed  not  on  the  basis  of  mutual  recognition.
Where  there  is  no  mutual  recognition,  one’s  own  claim  about  one’s
legitimacy remains an empty claim, since there is no legitimacy unless if it
is intersubjectively recognized. If terrorists’ goal is to win on the level of
“right” rather than “might,” if they want to win public support for their
position as the injured party making rightful demands, then terrorists’
struggle for recognition of its legitimate grievances through violent acts is
self-defeating: the means of terrorism compromises its end.
In short, there is no real legitimacy without a party and its practice
first being recognized by what Lacan calls the big Other. This is why in
the  end,  insurgent  terrorism  is  incompatible  with  the  philosophy  of
recognition because law is the foundation for the struggle for recognition.
As Honneth points out,
[A]ll  human  coexistence  presupposes  a  kind  of  basic  mutual  affirmation
between subjects, since otherwise no form of being-together whatsoever could
ever  come into  existence.  Insofar  as  this  mutual  affirmation always  already
entails a certain degree of individual self-restraint, there is here a preliminary,
still implicit form of legal consciousness. But then the transition to the social
contract is to be understood as something that subjects accomplish in practice,
at the moment in which they become conscious of their prior relationship of
recognition and elevate it to an intersubjectively shared legal relation.30
“Intersubjectivity”  is  a  key  word  Honneth  emphasizes  in  his
discussion  of  the  philosophy  of  recognition.  And  intersubjectivity  is
precisely  what  terrorism  brackets  in  its  unilateral  action  against  its
opponent.  Honneth’s  emphasis  on  law  and  legitimacy  resonates  with
Hegel’s own position. Hegel thinks that “international law should preserve
the possibility of peace —for example, ambassadors should be respected
and war be not waged against domestic institutions, against the peace of
family  and  private  life,  or  against  persons  in  their  private  capacity”.31
30 Cfr. Honneth (1995, n. 2), p.43.
31 Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel. (1942). Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox, §338
and 339. Oxford: At the Clarendon.
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Although Hegel  in  this  context  is  condemning  war  of  aggressions,  his
disapproval  of  attacking  private  citizens  would  entail  that  terrorism
cannot  be  legitimized  as  well.  From  Hegel’s  viewpoint,  states  are
represented  by  armies,  which  are  the  proper  entities  to  conduct  war.
Moreover, war is to be guided by principles derived from the modern idea
of  right  including respect for the property  and life  of  non-combatants.
Terrorists  violate  these  ideas  of  right  and  are  not  representatives  of
legitimate institutional bodies.
Honneth asserts that there is a moral grammar to social struggle.
Likewise,  we  can  also  say  that  there  is  a  moral  grammar  to  political
struggle, insurgent terrorism being a good case in point. However, it is
important to note that for Honneth, law provides the deep structure for
that moral grammar. As such, in the end, insurgent terrorism turns out
to be a perversion of Hegel and Honneth’s philosophy of recognition, and
it  is  a  perversion  in  the  Kantian  sense  of  the  perversion  of  the  will
discussed in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.
IV.b. The Root-Cause of Insurgent Terrorism and the Importance of 
Recognizing the Grievances of the Other
While insurgent terrorists fall short of gaining legitimacy through
recognizing the law, the law also risks losing its own legitimacy if it fails to
recognize  solidarity  as  one  important  basis  for  self-esteem  and  self-
realization. An abstract system of legal codes by itself cannot guarantee
equity  and as  such does  not  carry  enough authority  to  enjoin a  non-
violent struggle for recognition. This is why Honneth insists on “context-
sensitive  forms  of  the  application  of  law”.32 As  he  puts  it,  “the
concretization of legal relations [...] [need to] take the particular situation
of  individuals  better  into  account”.33 In  this  regard,  Honneth  is  again
indebted to Hegel who, along with Guizot, were aware of the need to create
institutions  that  reflected  people's  passions,  interests,  and  values.
Without  this  sensitivity  to  will,  law  could  become  unjust  and  even
tyrannical. 
Careless induction of all people into the same set of legal relations
with no sensitivity to particular cultural contexts can be experienced by
subaltern groups as a form of imposition and disrespect. Transgression of
this legal relation and a deliberate strike at  the legal  system (such as
those launched by the terrorists) maybe motivated by particular groups'
32 Cfr. Honneth (1995, n. 2), p.57.
33 Ibid.
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will  to  assert  their  identity  and  to  force  the  legal  establishment  to
recognize their particularities. Punishment of such transgressions would
only intensify the transgressor’s feeling of being disrespected and imposed
upon. Hegel develops a theory to this effect. His analysis of the desire for
recognition as the driving force behind crimes committed by individuals
can be adapted to understand the factor motivating terrorist groups and
their activities:
The inner source of crime is the coercive source of the law; exigency and so
forth  are  external  causes,  belonging  to  animal  need,  but  crime  is  directed
against  the  person  as  such  and  his  knowledge  of  it,  for  the  criminal  is
intelligent. His inner justification is coercion, the opposition to his individual
will to power, to counting as something, to be recognized. Like Herostratus, he
wants to be something,  not  exactly famous, but that  he exercise his will  in
defiance of the universal will.34
Honneth's  explication  of  this  paragraph  is  most  relevant  for
understanding insurgent terrorists’ readiness to stake out their lives for
recognition—that is, for the dignity of their community. Drawing attention
to  Hegel’s  saying  “Crime  represents  the  deliberate  injury  of  universal
recognition [Anerkanntsein]”,35 Honneth explains  that  “the  motivational
cause of such an act lies in the feeling of not having the particularity of
one's  'own will' recognized in the application of legal coercion”. Honneth
goes on to compare this defiance of the legal establishment to the human
willingness to give up one’s life for honor in the Master/Slave dialectic: “In
this sense,  what occurs  […]  in the case of  crime is  the same as what
occurred (as part of the conditions for the individual formative process) in
the case of the struggle for life and death”.36
Sensitivity to cultural contexts when deciding legitimacy issues is of
paramount importance to make possible a non-violent form of struggle for
recognition. It is precisely this need to give due recognition to subaltern
groups  that  animates  the  ending  of  Seyla  Benhabib’s  essay  “Unholy
Wars”.  “Unholy  War”  is  primarily  a  critique  of  terrorism.  Nonetheless,
toward the end of the essay, Benhabib indirectly faults the West for being
partly responsible for radicalizing the Muslims by denying them proper
recognition and treating them with contempt:
34 Hegel  (1983,  n.  30),  pp.  130  ff.  Hegel  (1969)  Jenaer  Realphilosophie,  p.224.
Hamburg: Meiner, 1969. Trans. corrected by J. Anderson (n.6), p.53.
35 Hegel (1983, n. 30), pp.131 and 224.
36 Cfr. Honneth (1995, n. 2), p. 53.
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Given  the  global  entertainment  industry's  profound  assault  on  their  [the
Muslims']  identity  as  Muslims,  and  given  the  profound  discrimination  and
contempt which they experience in their host societies as new immigrants who
are perceived to have “backward” morals and ways of life, many young Muslims
today turn to Islamism and fundamentalism. Commenting on l'affair folard (the
headscarf  affair)  in  France,  in  which some female  students  took  to  wearing
traditional headscarfs less as a sign of submission to religious patriarchy than
as  an  emblem  of  difference  and  defiance  against  homogenizing  French
republican traditions.37
The true answer to insurgent terrorism, in other words, is not by
force,  but  to  try  to  understand  the  terrorists’  grievances  and  their
particular  contexts,  and  to,  as  Honneth  suggests,  “conceptualize  the
ethical  sphere  of  the  State  as  an intersubjective  relationship in  which
members of  society could know themselves  to  be reconciled with each
other  precisely  to  the  degree  to  which  their  uniqueness  would  be
reciprocally recognized”.38
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